In a probability-based reasoning system, Bayes' theorem and its variations are often used to revise the system's beliefs. However, if the explicit con ditions and the implicit conditions of probability assignments are properly distinguished, it follows that Bayes' theorem is not a generally applicable revision rule. Upon properly distinguishing be lief revision from belief updating, we see that Jeffrey's rule and its variations are not revision rules, either. Without these distinctions, the lim itation of the Bayesian approach is often ignored or underestimated. Revision, in its general form, cannot be done in the Bayesian approach, because a probability distribution function alone does not contain the information needed by the operation.
INTRODUCTION
In a reasoning system that deals with uncertainty, a propo sition can be represented as A [m] , where A is a sentence of a formal language, and m indicates the sentence's uncer tainty.
In different systems, A and m may have different forms and interpretations, and the operations on them may be defined differently. However, there are still operations shared by many systems, in spite of all the differences (Bhatnagar and Kana! 1986):
Comparison: To decide which of the Ai [�] has the high est certainty by compru·ing � (i = 1, 2, · · · , n). Propagation: To get a conclusion An+! [mn+d from a set of premises Ai [�] . where An+! is different from Ai (i = 1, 2, · · · , n).
Revision: To modify the uncertainty value of a proposition
A from m tom' in the light of other propositions.
Defined as above, propagation (or inference) and revision (or combination) are cleru·ly different.
In propagation, the system generates a new proposition (with its certainty value) that was not mnong the premises.
In revision, the system modifies the certainty value of an existing proposition.
Other authors may use the two words differently (Pearl 1988 ), but we can still make the above distinction, no matter how the operations are named.
Bayes' theorem seems to be an exception. In some systems, it is used as a propagation rule, while in others, as a revision rule. Let's begin our analysis with these two usages, which will lead us to the kernel of the debate on the limitations of the Bayesian approach as a model of reasoning with uncertainty.
PROPAGATION VS. REVISION
According to probability theory, it is necessary to define a proposition space S in order for a system to represent and calculate probabilities of propositions. S is the set of all propositions to be processed by the system, and may be generated from a set of atomic propositions, using logical operators (Wise and Henrion 1986) .
As the starting point of all probability calculations, a prior probability distribution should be defined on S, under the constraints of the axioms of probability theory.
To choose such a prior probability distribution for a spe cific problem domain, some background knowledge (such as statistical data or subjective estimates) and general prin ciples (such as the principle of indifference or maximum entropy) are necessary. Let's refer to them collectly as C , the implicit condition of the distribution function, and write the prior probability distribution function as
Po: S--> [0, 1].
From Bayes' theorem, we can get the conditional probabil ity of A1 under the condition that A2 is true (obviously, the conditional probability is also based on C):
(1)
where A1 ru1d A2 are both in S (so A1 1\ A2 is in S, too), and P0(A2) > 0. To prevent confusion, I call A2 the explicit condition of the conditional probability assignment, to distinguish it from C.
Considering the three previously defined operations, we can see that Bayes' theorem, when used like this, is actually a propagation rule, not a revision rule, for the following reasons:
1. The conclusion is a conditional proposition, differing from the premises, which are both unconditional.
2. The rule derives a new probability assignment, instead of modifying a previous assignment. The prior (un conditional) probability assignment of A1 is still valid and available for future usages.
3. It is unnecessary for the system to know whether A2
is really true when applying the theorem. The condi tional probability is gotten under the assumption that A2 is true. If the system has enough resources, it can calculate all possible conditional probabilities using only the prior probabilities, without any "new infor mation" that has not been included in C.
Used in this way, Bayes' theorem is a rule for propagating probability assignments from prior probabilities Pc(:z:) to conditional probabilities Pc(:z:Jy), not a revision rule for changing Pc(:z:) to a new probability distribution P0,(:z:), according to new evidence.
But when we perform the previously mentioned "compari son" operation, usually what we are concerned with is the probability of propositions under all available evidence.
For example, If we want to know which of A1 and A2 is more likely to be true, we'll compare Pc(Ai) and P0(A2)
at the very beginning, when all of our knowledge about the problem is C. Later, if we get new evidence that shows A3 to be true (A3 E S), we will compru·e Pc(A1JA3) and Pc(A2IA3), which can be calculated according to (1). In such a case, to compare the "probability" of A1 and A2, the implicit condition C and the explicit condition A3 are merged together to become "all available evidence".
Since the distinction between these two types of conditions no longer seems necessru·y here, it is possible to "compile" all of the explicit conditions that turn out to be true into the implicit condition of the probability distribution function, transforming the related conditional probabilities into new unconditional probabilities. This is the "conditionalization principle" (Earman 1992, Levi 1983, and Weirich 1983) .
To distinguish this usage from the previous one of Bayes' theorem, a new function BEL( :z:) cru1 be defined on S (Pearl 1986 ), which representing the probability distribution under all available evidence:
where :z: E S, ru1d K is the current evidence. that is, the conjunction of all propositions in S that ru· e known to be true.
Similarly, we can define a conditional distribution for BEL(:z:) as follows (when Pc(yJK ) > 0):
Consistently with previous definitions, we refer to y as the probability assignment's explicit condition, and to C and K as its implicit condition. We are interested in the truth values of a set of proposi tions S, but our knowledge about them is incomplete or inaccurate. At the very beginning, we have some back ground knowledge C, which provides the prior probability distribution for the system. Later, when the system get new knowledge C', we want it to adjust its probability distri bution to summarize both C and C'. In such a way, the system can learn from its experience, and the defects in C are remediable.
Of course, every information processing system has restric tions about the type of new knowledge that can be accepted. However, it is reasonable to expect that the domain knowl edge which can be put into the system a priori (in C), can also be put into it a posteriori (in C').
Now we can see why I distinguish implicit conditions from explicit conditions: for the Bayesian approach, an implicit condition is the knowledge that we can put into a probability distribution initially, and an explicit condition is the knowl edge that the system can learn hereafter by using Bayes' theorem as a revision rule. The first question is answered by the three preconditions given at the end of the previous section. I claim that these preconditions cannot be applied to implicit conditions in general, for the following rea•;ons:
1. An explicit condition must be a bimu·y proposition, but an implic it condition cru1 include statistical con clusions and subjective probabilistic estimates.
2. An explicit condition must be in S, but knowledge in an implicit condition only need to be related to S. For example, "Tweety is a bird ru1d crumot fly" can be part of an implicit condition, even though S includes only "Birds can fly", and does not include the nrune "Tweety" at all. 3. If a proposition is assigned a prior probability of zero according to C, it crumot be used as an explicit condi tion to revise the function. However, in practical do mains, it is possible for the proposition to be assigned a non-zero probability according to another knowledge source C'.
Now we c<m see that only certain types of implicit conditions can be represented as explicit conditions. It follows that if some knowledge isn' 1 available when the prior probability is determined, it is impossible to be pw into the system through conditionalization.
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Moreover, if we insist that all implicit conditions must sat isfy the three preconditions, the prior probability distribu tion will degenerate into a consistent assignment of 0 or 1 to each proposition inS, and, after the assignment, the system will be unable to accept any new knowledge at all.
From a practical point of view, the restrictions set by the three preconditions are not trivial, since they mean that although the background knowledge can be probabilistic valued, all new knowledge must be binary-valued; no novel concept and proposition CM appear in new knowledge; Md if a proposition is given a probability 1 or 0, such a belief cannot be changed in the future, no matter what happens.
We could build such a system, but unfortunately it would be a far cry from the everyday reasoning process of a human being.
Bayes' theorem can be used as a revision rule, but with very strong restrictions. These limitations are so obvious and well-known that they seems trivial and are often ignored.
Some people claim that the Bayesian approach is suffi cient for reasoning with uncertainty, and many people treat Bayes' theorem as a generally applicable revision rule, be cause explicit conditions and implicit conditions of a prob ability assignment are seldom clearly distinguished in the discussions (Cheesemru1 1985 (Cheesemru1 , 1986 (Cheesemru1 , and 1988 Pearl 1986 Pearl , 1987 Pearl , ru1d 1988 , where it is very common that 1. the prior probability of proposition H is formulated as P(AIK), 2. conditional probability is formulated as P(AIE, K), 3. belief revision is described as the process by which P(AIB) and P(AIC) are combined to produce P(AIB,C).
What does the K (and B, C) mean in these formulas? Pearl interpreted P(AIK) as "a person's subjective belief in A given a body of knowledge K" (Pearl 1987 ). Cheeseman said that conditional probability statements contain the con text (conditions) associated with their values, which "make explicit our prior knowledge" (CheesemM 1986). If K re ally means implicit condition, then it should not be written in such a form, which suggests that it is a proposition inS; if it meru1s explicit condition, then the revision process is not coJTectly described in the above formula, where P(AIB) and P (A I C) share the same implicit condition (so it can be omitted).
Without a clear distinction between implicit conditions and explic it conditions, the illusion arises that all the knowledge supporting a probability distribution can be represented by expl icit conditions, and can therefore be learned by the system using Bayes' theorem. As a result, the capacity of Bayes' theorem is overestimated.
UPDATING VS. REVISION
Now let us examine some other tools in probability theory that have been used for revision, to see whether we can avoid the three preconditions.
After a prior probability dist1ibution Pc is assigned to a proposition spaceS, if some new evidence shows that "The probability of a proposition A (A E S) should be changed to m", assuming the conditional probabilities that with A or -.A as explicit condition are unchanged, we can update the probability assignment for every proposition x in S to get a new distribution function by using Jeffrey's rule (Kyburg 198 7 and Pearl 1988) :
If we interpret "A happens" as "A's probability should be changed to 1 ",then Bayes' theorem, when used as a revision rule, becomes a special case of Jeffrey's rule, where m = 1.
As a generalized version, Jeffrey's rule avoids the first pre condition of Bayes' theorem, that is, the new evidence must be a binary proposition. However, the other limitations are still applicable, that is, A E Sand Pc(A) > 0, otherwise Pc(:z:JA) is undefined.
More than that, the rule is an updating rule, by which I mean a very special way of changing a system's beliefs.
In an updating, when the new knowledge "the probability of A should be m " anives, the system's opinion on A is completely dominated by the new knowledge, regardless of Pc(A). the previous opinion about A (Dubois and Prade 1991) , and then the distribution function is modified ac cordingly. Such a complete updating seldom happ.ens in human reasoning. For revision in general, new evidence usually causes an adjustment, rather than an abandonment, of the previous opinion.
A related method was suggested to process "uncertain evi
, where a "virtual proposition" V is introduced to represent the new knowledge a� "a (unspeci fied) proposition Vis true, and P(EJV) = m" (Cheeseman 1986 and Nilsson 1986) . Then a new conditional probabil ity distribution can be calcula,ted (after considering the new knowledge) for each proposition x E S in the following way:
Under the assumption that
(10)
equation (8) can be simplified into
If we transform the explicit condition into the implicit con dition by conditionalization, we end up almost with Jeffrey's rule. The only difference is that the prior probability is not updated directly, but is instead conditionalizedby a virtual condition (the unspecified proposition V). However, no matter which procedure is followed and how the process is interpreted, the result is the same.
Some other systems process uncertain evidence by provid ing likelihood ratios of virtual propositions (Pearl 1986 an� Heckerman 1988 , and this method also leads to condl tionalization of a virtual condition, therefore the rule is an updating rule, too.
What I mean isn't that updating is not a valid operation in uncertain reasoning, but that it is different from revision.
In certain situations, it is more proper to interpret belief changes as updatings (Dubois and Prade 1991 ) , but revision seems to be a more general and important operation. When there are conflicts among beliefs, it is unusual that one piece of evidence can be completely suppressed by another piece of evidence, even though it make sense to assume that new evidence is usually "stronger" than old evidence.
A DEFECT OF THE BAYESIAN APPROACH
Technically, all the above discussed limitations of Ba � es' theorem and Jeffrey's rule are known to the uncertamty rea�oning community, but it is also a fact that they are of ten ignored or misunderstood. As a result, the limitation of Bayesian approach is usually underestimated. One rea son for this, as I claimed previously, is the confusing of propagation and revision, updating and revision, as ��II as explicit condition and implicit condition of a probability assignment. Once again, other authors may prefer to name these concepts differently, and what I want to insist is the necessity of making such distinctions.
By Bayesian approach, I mean systems where 1. cunent knowledge is represented as a (real-valued) probability distribution on a proposition space, and 2. new knowledge is learned by conditionalization.
Using previously introduced formalism, the knowledge base of the system at a given instant can be represented as Pa(x). where xES.
I claim that the system cannot cany out the general revision task, that is, to learn the new knowledge A[m], which may conflict with the system's current beliefs.
Actually, the conclusion directly follows from the discus sions in the previous sections:
1. It crumot be done by directly using Bayes' theorem, since m may be in (0, 1 ), A may not be in S, and Pc(A) may be 0.
2. The task cannot be fonnulated as "from P(AIC) and P(A IC') to get P(AIC 1\ C')", then processed by Bayes' theorem, since it is not always possible (or make sense) to represent implicit conditions as explicit conditions.
3.
It cannot be done by using Jeffrey's rule or its vari ations, since usually we don't want the system's pre vious opinion Pc(A) (if A E 5) to be completely ignored.
If the above arguments are accepted as valid, there are some further questions:
1. Do we really need a system to do revision in the general sense?
2. Why it cannot be done in the Bayesian approach?
3. How to do it in a formal reasoning system?
For the first question, if we wrull to apply the Bayesiru1 approach to a practical domain, one of the the following requirements must be satisfi ed:
1. The implicit condition of the initial probability distri bution, that is, the domain knowledge used to deter mine the distribution, can be assumed to be immune from future modifications; or 2. All modifications of the implicit condition can be treated as updating, in the sense that when new knowl edge conflict with old knowledge, the latter is com pletely abru1doned.
From artificial intelligence's point of view, such domains are exceptions, rather than general situations. In most cases, we cannot guru·ru11ee that all knowledge the system get is un changeable, or later acquired knowledge is always "truer" than earlier acquired knowledge. More thru1 that, under certain conditions we even crumot guru· antee that the sys tem's beliefs are free from internal conflicts (Wang 1993).
Therefore, we really hope a formal system can revise its knowledge in the general sense.
For the second question, let's look at the revision operation as defi ned in the first section. For a proposition A, if from some evidence C1 its certainty value is eva! uated as m1, but from some other evidence C2 its certainty value is evaluated as ffi2, then what should be the system's opinion on A's certainty, when both cl and c2 ru·e taken into consideration?
Obviously, the result not only depends on m1 ru1d m2, but also depends on the relation between C1 and C2.
For examples, if C2 is already included in C1, then m1 is the final result; if C1 ru1d C2 come from different sources, m1d C1 consists of large amount of statistical data, but C2 only consists of a few exmnples, then the result will be closer to m1 than to m2.
In the Bayesian approach, above mi 's become probability assignments, and Ci 's become implicit conditions of these assignments. However, in probability theory, there is no
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The Bayesian approach have no available revision rule, be cause its representation is not sufficiently infonnativelittle information is there about the implicit condition of the current probability distribution.
It is impossible for the third question to be discussed throughoutly in this paper. Here I only want to make one claim: if the system's beliefs are still represented by a set of propositions, then the uncertainty of each proposition must be indicated by something that is more complicated than a single (real) number. As discussed above, the infonnation about Ci cannot be derived from ffii . To revise a belief, the belief's implicit condition must be somehow represented.
AN EXAMPLE
There are several paradigms using more than one numbers to represent a proposition's uncertainty, such as Dempster
Shafer theory (Shafer 1976), probability interval (Weichsel berger ru1d Pohlmann 1990), and higher-order probability (Paa 81991). I'm also working on an intelligent reasoning system myself, which use a pair of real numbers as a propo sition's "truth-value". The comparison and evaluation of these systems m· e beyond the scope of this paper, but I will use an exmnple processed by my system to show concretely the problem or the Bayesian approach that discussed in the previous sections.
The system, "Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System" (or "NARS" for short), is described in a technical report (Wang 1993) in detail. In the following, I'll briefly mention (with necessary simplifications) some of its properties that are most directly related to our current topic.
In NARS, domain knowledge is represented as judgments, and each judgment has the following fonn:
where S is the subject of the judgment, and P is the predi cate. "S c P" can be intuitively understood as "S are P", which is further interpreted as "P inherits S's instances and S inherits P's properties". "< j, c >" is the judgment's tntt h value, where f is the frequency of the judgment, and cis the confidence.
In the simplist ca�e. the judgment's truth value can be deter mined like this: if the system has checked the "inheritance relation" between S m1d P for n times (n > 0) by looking at S's instru1ces, and in m times (n 2:: m 2:: 0) the checked instance is also in P, then f = mjn, and c = n/(n + k). 1
Here the meaning of f is obvious: it is the inheritance relation's "success frequency", according to the system's experience. The "confidence" c is introduced mainly for the purpose of revision. Given two propositions that have the same frequency, their confidence, that is, how diffi cult the corresponding frequency can be revised by future evi dence, may be quite different. When n is lru· ge, c is large, too, indicating that the frequency f is based on many srun ples, therefore will be more stable during a revision than a frequency that is only supported by several srunples. 2
Here is an exrunple that shows how NARS works.
Stage 1
The system is provided with two judgments by the user:
J,: dove C flyer <0.9, 0.9> J 2 : dove C bird < 1, 0.9 > which means the user tells the system that "About 90%
doves are flyers", and "Doves ru·e birds". The confi dence of the judgments are pretty high, indicating that they ru·e strongly supported by background knowledge of the user.
From these judgments, the system can use its induction rule 3 to generate a conclusion J3 : bird C flyer < 0.9, 0.288 > That is, "About 90% birds are flyers", with a low confi dence, since the estimation of frequency is only based on information about doves.
Stage 2
The system is provided with other two judgments by the user:
J4 : swan C flyer < 0.9, 0.9 > J s : swan C bird < 1, 0.9 > That is, "About 90% swru1s are flyers", and "Swans are birds", also with high confidence values.
Again by induction, the system get:
J6: bird C flyer <0.9, 0.288 > J6 and h looks identical with each other, but they comes from different sources (NARS cru1 recognize this).
2 This is only the simplest case, but not the general method, to determine the truth value of a proposition.
3NARS' induction rule: from two premises M c p <!I, CI > l M c s <h. C2 > the fo llowing conclusion can be generated
Since k = 2, all inductive conclusions are hypotheses with low confi dences (c < 1/3 ).
Now the system can use its revision rule 4 to merge J3 and J6 into J1: bird C flyer <0.9, 0.447>
Here the frequency is not modified (since the two premises give the same estimation), but the confidence of the con clusion is higher, because now the frequency estimation is supported by more evidence (dove and swan).
Stage 3
The system is provided with two more judgments by the user:
Js : penguin C flyer < 0, 0.9 > J9 : penguin C bird < 1, 0.9 > That is, "No penguin is a flyer", and "Penguins are birds", also with high confi dence values.
By induction, the system get from them J 10 : bird C flyer < 0, 0.288 > Therefore, penguin provide a negative example for "Birds are flyers", but doesn't completely "falsify" the hypothesis, because the hypothesis is treated by NARS as a statisti cal proposition, rather than an universal generalization in
Popper's sense (Popper 1968) .
Using J1 and ho as premises, the conclusion is further revised:
J,, : bird C flyer < 0.6, 0.548 >
The frequency of the result is lower than that of J1 (where only positive examples are available), but higher than J10
(where only negative examples are available), and closer to h than to J1 0 , since the former has a higher confidence (that is, supported by more evidence). The order that the two promises are acquired by the system is irrelevant -"new knowledge" doesn't have a higher priority in revision.
The confidence of J,1 is higher than either of the premises, because in revision the conclusion always summarizes the 4NARS' revision rule: if the two premises sc P < !I. ci>, sc P <h. c 2 > come from different sources, the following conclusion can be generated:
If the two premises come fr om correlative sources, the one that has a higher confidence is chosen as the result. This is the rule in NARS that corresponds to updating as discussed in previous sections.
For a detailed discussion about the rules (as well as other rules in NARS, such as those for deduction and abduction), see the technical report (Wang 1993).
premises, therefore supported by more evidence (compared with the premises), no matter whether the premises m·e consistent with each other (as when h is generated) or in conflict with each other (as when J11 is generated).
Without detailed discussing about how the truth values are calculated in NARS, we can still get some general impres sions about how revisions are carried out in NARS:
1. Revision is used to summmize information about the same proposition that comes from different sources.
2. All propositions m·e revisable.
3. When two propositions m·e summarized, the frequency of the result looks like a weighted sum of the frequen cies of the premises, with the weights determined by the confidence of the premises.
4.
The confi dence of a revision conclusion is always higher than the confidence of either of the premises.
5. Frequency and confidence m· e two independent mea surements, that is, it is impossible to determine one from the other. In the above exmnple, J6 and h have the same frequency but different confidence; J6 m1d J10 have the same confidence but different frequency.
6. Generally, the two measurements of certainty have different functions in representing a system's beliefs: frequency is indicating the extent to which a belief is positive ("Yes, it is the ca�e.") or negative ("No, it is not the case."), and confi dence is indicating the extent to which a belief is stable ("Yes, I'm sure.") or fragile ("No, it is only a guess.").
I believe that these properties are also shm· ed by actual human uncertain reasoning.
In probability theory, especially in the Bayesian approach, the two factors (f cu1d c) m· e somehow summarized into a single "probability distribution". When a proposition is assigned a probability closing to 1, usually it mecu1s that almost all the background knowledge support the prediction that the proposition is true, <md the system already know a lot about the proposition. When a proposition is a�signed a probability closing to 0.5, however, there ru·e different possibilities: sometimes it means that the system knows little about the proposition; sometimes it means the system knows a lot, but the positive evidence and the negative evidence are almost equally strong.
Combining these two factors into a single mem ; urement seems fine (and sometimes even more convenient) for the comparison <Uld propagation operation. but it clocsn 't work well for the revision operation. a.:; discussed above.
Even this conclusion is not completely new. All paradigms that use more thru1 one numbers to represent uncertainty come from the observation that "Ignorance cannot be prop erly represented by a real-value probability distribution". However, t h is observation is also often misinterpreted.
To argue against the opinion that "more than one number is needed to represent uncertainty", Chccscrmm claimed (Cheeseman 1985 ) that a point value and a density func tion will give the srune result in decision making, which I
Belief Revision in Probability Theory 525 agree to certain extent. However, I believe he was wrong by saying that standard deviation Cllil be used to capture "the change of expectations" (or revision, as defined in this paper). If we test a proposition n times, m1d the results are the smne, then the standard deviation of the results is 0, that is, independent ton. But our confidence about "the result will remain the same" will obviously increase with n. Actu ally, what the standard deviation measures is the variations runong the srunples (which has little to do with revision), but what the confidence measures, intuitively speaking, is the amount of the samples.
Peru·! said our confidence in the assessment of BEL (E) is measured by the (narrowness of the) distribution of BEL(Eic) as c ranges over all combinations of contin gencies, and each combination c is weighted by its current belief BEL(c) (Pearll988). I agree with him that ignorance is the lack of confidence, and confidence Cllil be measured by how much a belief assignment can be modified by pos sible future evidence. However, in his definition, he still assumes that all relevant future evidence causing a belief chm1ge cm1 be represented as an explicit condition, and can be processed through conditionalization. As a result, his mem;urement of confi dence cannot captures the ignorance about implicit conditions.
No matter whether other paradigms Cllil solve the problem, I claim that when the "ignorm1ce" to be represented is about ru1 implicit condition, it cannot be hm1dled properly by the Bayesian approach. For a specific domain, if revision is a crucial operation for the solving of the practical problems, the Bayesian approach cannot be used, m1d other paradigms should be considered.
SUMMARY
The following conclusions have been drawn:
1. Propagation and revision are different operations in reasoning systems where uncertainty is represented ru1d processed; the former generates new beliefs (with truth values), and the latter modifies truth values of previous beliefs.
2. The explicit condition and the implicit condition of a probability a�signment are different, and the latter has a much greater capacity for representing knowledge.
3. When used as revision rules, Bayes' theorem merges explicit condition with implicit condition. Its ability is therefore limited.
4. Jeffrey's rule (and its variations) is m1 upclating rule (replacing old knowledge by new knowledge), rather thcu1 a revision rule in the general sense (combining knowledge from different sources).
5. In the Bayesiru1 approach, there is no way to do re vision, because the "frequency" factor m1d the "con fidence" factor in a probability distribution cm1not be distinguished from each other, and these two factors have different functions in revision.
6. For a system to solve the revision problem, it is not sufficiently informative to represent a proposition's un certainty by a single number.
